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I. INTRODUCTION
Delaware inhabits a competitive landscape that includes, but is not
limited to, corporate law. Like other small jurisdictions active in crossborder corporate and financial services, Delaware has become widely
associated with a particular area of specialization, providing de facto U.S.
corporate law for large, publicly traded companies. However, the economic
development imperatives prompting this have also led Delaware to explore
opportunities in related though distinct fields that build upon this platform,
effectively leveraging their corporate law advantage to expand and diversify
the state’s revenue streams. This Article assesses Delaware’s competitive
position amidst this broader landscape.
Part II provides an overview of prevailing accounts of U.S. corporate
charter competition, which generally conclude that Delaware faces quite
limited competition from other states.1 When the frame of reference is
limited to domestic corporate charter competition, only federal preemption
would appear to pose a substantial threat to Delaware’s dominance. In
response to these prevailing accounts, this Part suggests that such a narrow
view of the competitive landscape misses important dynamics that could
© 2020 Christopher M. Bruner.
* Stembler Family Distinguished Professor in Business Law, University of Georgia School of
Law. For helpful thoughts and suggestions, thanks to participants at the 2020 Maryland Law Review
Symposium and the 2020 National Business Law Scholars Conference.
1. See infra Part II.
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affect Delaware’s position moving forward. Minimally, these include the
emergence of competitors abroad that challenge Delaware’s corporate
dominance on multiple fronts—both internationally and with respect to
chartering of large companies based in the United States.
Part III pushes the analysis further by assessing Delaware’s broader
competitive landscape beyond corporate law.2 This Part reframes the matter
by reference to underlying economic development imperatives, which are
particularly pressing for smaller, resource-constrained jurisdictions like
Delaware. It then examines Delaware’s efforts to leverage corporate law—
that is, to build on Delaware’s corporate law advantage by expanding into
related though distinct fields that build upon that preexisting platform,
including aspects of financial services and insurance where chartering and
innovative entity structures loom large.
Part IV concludes, observing that this broader framing—including
cross-border and extra-corporate dynamics—reveals a more complex
competitive landscape than prevailing accounts can accommodate.3 Overall,
Delaware faces real competition from a range of domestic and foreign
jurisdictions that have grappled with similar economic development
challenges through similar strategies, producing global competitive
dynamics that may substantially impact Delaware’s long-term prospects.
II. DELAWARE’S CORPORATE COMPETITION
Prevailing accounts of U.S. corporate charter competition generally
describe Delaware’s position as essentially unassailable, save only the
(remote) possibility of substantial federal preemption. This Part provides a
brief overview of such accounts and assesses them amidst a broader
competitive landscape—notably, the rise of foreign competitors challenging
Delaware in both international and domestic contexts.
A. Prevailing Accounts
As a constitutional matter, corporate law in the United States has
traditionally been left to the states themselves.4 Potential for domestic charter
competition, then, arises from the internal affairs doctrine, a choice-of-law
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”). While James Madison proposed to the Constitutional Convention that Congress be given
broad incorporation powers, his proposal was not adopted. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER
KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 79 n.6 (5th
ed. 2016); Christopher M. Bruner, What is the Domain of Corporate Law? 29–30 (Univ. of Ga. Sch.
of L. Rsch. Paper Series No. 2019-04, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308611.
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rule under which a corporation’s internal affairs are generally governed by
the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of where the corporation is
headquartered or predominately operates.5 In the corporate law literature,
these dynamics have long been assessed by reference to whether the resulting
competition to attract incorporations is likely to result in a race to the bottom,
with states eliminating beneficial regulation to lower compliance costs, or a
race to the top, with states favoring regulation that efficiently balances the
interests of various corporate constituencies.6
Over time, these conflicting positions have only ossified through their
association with conflicting views on the law-and-economics-inspired
“nexus of contracts” conception of the corporation. Proponents of this
conception generally assume a high level of market efficiency and minimal
potential for harmful externalities, in which light charter competition appears
inherently efficient because it reflects market preferences.7 Opponents of the
nexus conception, meanwhile, reject those assumptions and correlatively
argue that charter competition promotes socially harmful outcomes because
it enables corporations to opt into laws that favor corporate insiders at the
expense of outsiders who do not participate in incorporation decisions, and
whose interests will accordingly be disregarded by states competing for
corporate charters.8
Whatever the merits of these competing policy positions may be,9
empirical studies have concluded that Delaware faces little meaningful
competition among U.S. states when it comes to attracting incorporations

5. See REST. (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302(2), 304 (1971). See also CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479
(1977); ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 107–31 (2009).
6. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (characterizing Delaware as “contributing to the deterioration of
corporation standards”) with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that state charter competition
“should tend toward optimality so far as the shareholder’s relationship to the corporation is
concerned”).
7. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 35–39, 212–18 (1991).
8. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 114–19 (2006).
9. In prior work, I tend toward the latter view, rejecting highly shareholder-centric approaches
to corporate law on both positive and normative grounds. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013); see also Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner, Corporations and
Sustainability, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND SUSTAINABILITY 3 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019); Christopher M. Bruner
& Beate Sjåfjell, Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and the Pursuit of Sustainability, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY,
supra, at 713.
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from companies based elsewhere.10 At the interstate level, Delaware at most
faces competitive pressure to maintain rules appealing to institutional
investors in large public companies,11 and “defensive” competition from
other states that aim to keep locally headquartered companies incorporated
there.12 Beyond this, Delaware’s only real domestic competition for
corporate charters would appear to be the federal government, insofar as the
Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to federalize corporate law for
companies operating in interstate commerce.13 To date, Congress has
exercised this authority only sporadically and in response to crises,
substantially leaving the core of corporate governance in public companies
to Delaware.14 Over 1 million business entities “have made Delaware their
legal home,”15 and this includes “more than two thirds of the Fortune 500 and
80 percent of all firms that go public.”16
While the early days of U.S. charter competition in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries do bear the hallmarks of a regulatory race to the
bottom—with New Jersey attracting incorporations from New York through
adoption of a permissive corporate statute, and Delaware taking over when
New Jersey later cracked down under then-Governor Woodrow Wilson17—
Delaware now has a more favorable story to tell about its attractions as a
10. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 578 (2002); Robert
Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1570-74 (2002); Marcel
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679,
687 (2002).
11. See Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate
Law, 12 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 60, 81–82 (2020) (finding that “although Delaware has
substantial market power, if it adopted laws that signal to the market that it does not view takeovers
favorably, it would lose significant market share”).
12. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition
for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214 (2006).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States”). For additional background, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117
HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009). Congress derives further incorporation powers from the Necessary and
Proper clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power “To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States”); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–09, 422–25 (1819) (holding that the federal government
could incorporate a national bank as “a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the
prosecution of its fiscal operations”).
14. BRUNER, supra note 9, at 37–38, 276–77.
15. Why Businesses Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/whybusinesses-choose-delaware/ (last visited July 31, 2020).
16. Annual
Report
Statistics,
DEL.
DIV.
OF
CORPS.
(2018),
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-Annual-Report.pdf.
17. See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-DOMINANT
SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 179–81 (2016).
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jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Today, Delaware
fairly cites the benefits of “an enabling statute intended to permit
corporations and their shareholders the maximum flexibility in ordering their
affairs,” a legislature that “gives a high priority to corporation law matters,”
expert judges producing considerable corporate case law, and a serviceoriented and “user-friendly” Division of Corporations.18 From a competitive
perspective, a sparse statute and heavy reliance on case-by-case judicial
application of abstract fiduciary concepts such as loyalty, care, and good faith
generates a body of corporate law that is essentially “unique and not easily
replicated” elsewhere.19
B. International Competition in Corporate Law
The foregoing accounts generally suggest that Delaware now enjoys
advantages in the market for corporate charters that would be difficult for
domestic competitors to overcome to any meaningful degree. It is critical to
observe, however, that these accounts focus solely on the domestic picture.
These matters take on a different cast when one recalls that capital is
increasingly mobile, fueling global regulatory competition in numerous areas
of corporate and financial services.20 This requires that some account be
taken of where Delaware sits relative to competition from abroad.
As a threshold matter, Delaware officials themselves are well aware of
these dynamics, and actively pursue international incorporations business. In
a marketing piece aptly titled “Beyond the Borders,” the Delaware Division
of Corporations argues that, for the same reasons they appeal to domestic
entities, “Delaware’s business statutes are also attractive to foreign
businesses seeking a home for their U.S. business ventures.”21 At the same
time, the attractions of Delaware business entities have not gone unnoticed
internationally, and in this context Delaware faces considerable competition
from a range of jurisdictions—notably various British Overseas Territories
such as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands, another

18. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 2–10 (2007) (pamphlet
printed and distributed by the Delaware Division of Corporations); see also WILLIAM W. BOYER &
EDWARD C. RATLEDGE, DELAWARE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 18–20 (2009); BRUNER, supra
note 17, at 181–83.
19. Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 247 (2015). For
discussion of the complex and idiosyncratic approaches to these concepts that have resulted, see
generally Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director
Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006); Christopher M. Bruner, Is the
Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1027 (2013).
20. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 30–38.
21. Beyond the Borders: Delaware’s Benefits for International Business, DELAWARE.GOV,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawares-benefits-international-business/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2020).
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category of sub-sovereign jurisdictions active in global corporate and
financial services.22
These market dynamics complicate the more benign account of
Delaware’s dominance cited above. Having itself pursued what (from the
U.S. vantage point) amounts to “offshore” incorporations business, Delaware
has exposed itself to accusations of purveying opaque shell companies
susceptible to money laundering, tax evasion, and other criminal activities—
a characterization fueled by Delaware’s long-standing refusal to collect
beneficial ownership information at the formation stage for corporations and
limited liability companies,23 although Delaware has recently voiced support
for a federal-level regime and taken other steps to prevent abuses.24
At the same time, the assumption that other jurisdictions cannot
effectively replicate the attractive features of Delaware’s system for
resolution of corporate disputes may be too simplistic. As Omari Simmons
has observed, several jurisdictions around the world, “borrowing in part from
Delaware’s model, have invested in their corporate adjudicative capabilities
to enhance their reputations for adjudicating business-related disputes.”25 He
adds that, in terms of global competition, “the prospect of firms eschewing
national courts for alternative dispute resolution is perhaps one of the greatest
potential threats to Delaware’s dominance,” particularly to the degree that
“international arbitration is favored among general counsels.”26 In this light,
“international arbitration hubs, such as London and emerging venues like
Singapore, are a potential long-term threat to Delaware’s dominance.”27

22. The British Virgin Islands represents the main incorporations competitor internationally.
See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 37, 234.
23. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 184–87, 228–30; Joachim Bartels, Discreet Delaware: Why
Corporate Secrecy and Money Laundering Have Thrived in the US, BUS. INFO. INDUS. ASS’N (Apr.
6, 2019), https://www.biia.com/discreet-delaware-why-corporate-secrecy-and-money-launderinghave-thrived-in-the-us. For the little information required to form a Delaware corporation or limited
liability company, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(a) (neither
requiring beneficial ownership information).
24. See, e.g., Annual Report Statistics, supra note 16 (citing efforts to “deny access to those
who attempt to use Delaware entities for nefarious purposes,” including adopting “Know Your
Customer” regulations and advocating “federal action to make beneficial ownership information
available
to
law
enforcement”);
Facts
and
Myths,
DELAWARE.GOV,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/facts-and-myths/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2020) (citing, in response to
charges of providing “anonymity and secrecy,” Delaware’s ban on bearer shares). See also
Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Opinion: More Could Be Done in Delaware to Prevent
Abuse
of
LLCs,
DEL.
ONLINE,
Mar.
7,
2019,
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/2019/03/07/delawares-corporate-law-needs-freshset-eyes-prevent-misuse/3093468002/.
25. Simmons, supra note 19, at 244.
26. Id. at 255.
27. Id. at 256; see also William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV.
1403 (2020).
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Hitting closer to home, foreign jurisdictions are even competing to
provide charters—and accordingly, corporate law—for large U.S.-listed
companies, Delaware’s bread and butter. Indeed, William Moon has found
that “foreign nations are juridical homes to over 14% of large publicly traded
corporations listed in American securities markets.”28 As he observes, this
could exert meaningful pressure on aspects of substantive corporate law
regarded as mandatory in Delaware.29 There is of course a double irony here:
insofar as Delaware itself markets an “enabling” approach to corporate law,
these jurisdictions might be said to have out-Delawared Delaware, and
insofar as this phenomenon arises from U.S. courts’ application of the
internal affairs doctrine to entities incorporated abroad, these jurisdictions
might be said to have hoisted Delaware on its own petard.30 Significantly,
British Overseas Territories once again predominate in this space—notably,
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands—and these
jurisdictions have actively sought “to differentiate their corporate law from
that of Delaware” in order to compete more effectively for chartering
business among U.S.-listed companies.31
III. DELAWARE’S BROADER COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE
The global dynamics discussed in Part II suggest that, even when the
frame of reference is limited to corporate law, prevailing accounts of charter
competition and Delaware’s dominance within that marketplace are oversimplified. This Part takes the analysis further by assessing the broader
competitive landscape that Delaware encounters beyond corporate law,
reframing the matter by reference to underlying economic development
imperatives and examining Delaware’s efforts to leverage its corporate law
advantage in other areas. These include aspects of financial services and
insurance where corporate chartering and innovative entity structures loom
large—the most consequential examples being credit card-issuing banks and
captive insurance companies.32 Each represents a distinct, though related,
“law market,”33 and understanding them is critical to a full understanding of
Delaware’s competitive position.
28. Moon, supra note 27, at 1407.
29. See id. at 1445–1453 (discussing how other jurisdictions have placed limitations on
derivative suits and inspection of books and records, while permitting greater capacity to reduce
fiduciary duty constraints).
30. Cf. id. at 1420–21, 1444.
31. See id. at 1423–29.
32. Blockchain-based businesses may prove to be another area where Delaware seeks to
leverage the preexisting corporate law advantage. See Christopher M. Bruner, Distributed Ledgers,
Artificial Intelligence and the Purpose of the Corporation, 79 CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2020)
(discussing the Delaware Blockchain Initiative).
33. On this concept, see O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 3.
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A. The Economic Development Imperative
Small, resource-constrained jurisdictions face unique economic
development challenges that render the development of high-value-added
services particularly attractive. Those, like Delaware, that have been
particularly successful in cross-border corporate and financial services tend
to have similar characteristics and pursue similar strategies. I have elsewhere
termed them “market-dominant small jurisdictions” (“MDSJs”), and
developed an ideal type to summarize their consequential features. MDSJs
(1) “are small and poorly endowed with natural resources, limiting their
economic-development options”; (2) “possess legislative autonomy” (though
not necessarily full sovereignty); (3) “are culturally proximate to multiple
economic powers, and favorably situated geographically vis-à-vis those
powers”; (4) “heavily invest in human capital, professional networks, and
related institutional structures”; and (5) “consciously balance close
collaboration with and robust oversight of the financial professional
community, seeking at once to convey flexibility, stability, and credibility.”34
A number of significant players in cross-border corporate and financial
services broadly reflect these characteristics and strategies, Delaware
included.35 Briefly, Delaware (1) is among the very smallest U.S. states in
both land area and population; (2) possesses substantial legislative autonomy
(even as a sub-sovereign) in corporate law and, as we will see, in lucrative
related fields; (3) is favorably positioned between, and connected with, the
finance capital (New York) and the political capital (Washington, D.C.); (4)
has heavily invested in various forms of corporate and financial services, in
addition to development of robust professional networks (for example, the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association) and related
institutional structures—activities facilitated by Delaware’s small size and
the relative proximity of relevant public and private actors; and (5) has
consciously cultivated balanced regulation in an effort to satisfice various
relevant constituencies—including the principal corporate governance actors
(management and shareholders), the main political parties (Delaware being
famously centrist), and external regulatory actors who could disrupt
Delaware’s market if substantial problems were to arise (i.e. Congress).36
The upshot of Delaware’s approach to economic development has been
its extraordinary reliance on servicing large corporations. While this might
be measured in various ways, there is no gainsaying the significance of
business entity registration for Delaware from an economic development

34. BRUNER, supra note 17, at 41–49 (emphasis removed).
35. See id. chs. 4–9 (providing case studies through this lens including Bermuda, Dubai,
Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Delaware).
36. See id. at 175–87; see also BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 26–28.
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perspective. The Division of Corporations reports that its collections have
accounted for approximately one-quarter of Delaware general fund revenues
over recent years,37 and the trend in total collections slopes upward.38 Even
this, however, understates Delaware’s dependence on incorporation-related
revenue sources. While personal income taxes were the largest single
revenue source for Delaware in 2014 ($1.14 billion), corporate franchise
taxes ($776.7 million) and abandoned property ($566.5 million) together
exceeded the state’s personal income tax revenues.39 This is significant
because, as an additional “financial benefit of Delaware’s corporate
franchise, abandoned property includes the unredeemed value of gift cards,
uncashed corporate checks, business-to-business credits, and dormant stock
accounts. If the company is incorporated in Delaware, the money comes
here.”40 Taking into account corporate income taxes as well, these direct
sources of corporation-related revenues accounted for almost 40% of
Delaware’s general fund revenues in 2014.41 As the Delaware Business
Roundtable summed it up in an analysis of Delaware’s budget, “the state has
been successful in ‘exporting’ its revenue burden through the large franchise
fee and abandoned property collections, from mostly out-of-state
businesses.”42
To be sure, this reflects adoption of a “uniquely aggressive abandoned
property program” to shore up the budget in the wake of the financial crisis,
generating abnormal revenues that could not be sustained indefinitely.43 It
also bears emphasizing, however, that the corporate chartering business made
this short-term opportunity uniquely available to Delaware in the first place,
and that the foregoing figures do not account for further state revenues that
are indirectly attributable to incorporations—for example, income taxes paid
by professionals employed to service Delaware corporations in various
capacities.44
37. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 176–77.
38. See Annual Report Statistics, supra note 16.
39. See Jonathan Starkey, Delaware Taxes: Top 5 Sources of State Revenue, DEL. ONLINE (May
19, 2014), http://delonline.us/1ne9ba0.
40. Id.
41. See Delaware Business Roundtable, Delaware’s Structural Budget Problem: Causes,
Potential Solutions, and Policy Tradeoffs (2015), https://www.dbrt.org/state-finances-study
(reporting that the franchise tax accounted for 23%, abandoned property for 13%, and the corporate
income tax for 3%).
42. Id. See also BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 138–39 (similarly calculating that
“32.3 percent of all 2007 revenue of Delaware’s state government came from businesses that for the
most part were not doing business in Delaware”).
43. See Delaware Business Roundtable, supra note 41 (describing retroactive collections and
forecasting a drop in such revenues moving forward).
44. Cf. BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 112 (observing that, in addition to corporate
franchise taxes, Delaware’s economy benefits from “the scale and productivity of the entire legal
industry in Delaware – the employment generated, wages paid, and services consumed”); Starkey,
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The foregoing data underscore both how successful Delaware has been
at cultivating incorporation-related revenue sources and how extraordinarily
dependent Delaware has become on revenues that trace back to that single
source. In this light, it is hardly surprising that Delaware would be keen to
diversify—including by expanding into new areas where the preexisting
corporate law foundation might give Delaware a leg up. Delaware’s
“Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy” recognizes that
“Delaware has long been noted for its pro-business climate” but that
“competition is now global,”45 and sets out a goal to “expand long-term
economic growth through focused recruitment of businesses complementary
to Delaware’s core business sectors,” including “financial services.”46
B. Leveraging Corporate Law
The economic development imperatives described above have led
Delaware to aggressively pursue opportunities to leverage its corporate law
advantage in other areas. These include aspects of financial services and
insurance where corporate chartering and innovative entity structures loom
large—notably, credit card-issuing banks and captive insurance companies.
In these contexts, however, Delaware has typically found itself following the
lead of other jurisdictions that had earlier ventured into such areas in order to
stake out fields of cross-border corporate and financial specialization of their
own, for largely similar reasons.
While there is a clear logic in Delaware’s effort to build upon its
preexisting corporate law foundation in each of these areas, Delaware’s
competition in these distinct fields complicates the prevailing accounts
described above in multiple respects. These additional fields of competition
reflect a concerted effort to branch out beyond corporate law; they place
Delaware in the less familiar, and perhaps uncomfortable, posture of being a
follower rather than a market leader; and they reveal a larger and more
complex competitive landscape for cross-border corporate and financial
services where Delaware does indeed face meaningful competition, both
domestically and abroad.
1. Credit Cards
In addition to its corporate franchise—and, in fact, as an extension of
it—Delaware has achieved substantial successes as a jurisdiction of
supra note 39 (observing that “personal income taxes remain the single largest source of state tax
revenue” in Delaware).
45. DEL. ECON. DEV. OFF., COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 22 (Dec.
20, 2014), https://business.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/118/2017/09/CEDS_Final
Revised12-20-2014.pdf.
46. Id. at 3, 30 (emphasis removed).
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incorporation for credit card-issuing banks. Indeed, “half of the nation’s
credit cards originate in Delaware, and about 48,000 state residents are
employed in the financial services industry, roughly one-tenth of the entire
workforce.”47 As in the corporate franchise context generally, the geographic
imbalance is apparent, as Delaware credit card issuers “represent about half
of the U.S. credit card market” yet “Delaware residents account for only 0.3%
of the U.S. population.”48 From an economic development perspective, both
the general incorporation business and the specific effort to attract credit
card-issuing banks reflect the same underlying drivers and capitalize on the
same sorts of features discussed above.49 The results have been similarly
impressive for Delaware. William Boyer and Edward Ratledge, a political
scientist and an economist, respectively, conclude that Delaware’s efforts to
cultivate credit card business have proven “as important historically for
Delaware’s economy as Delaware’s Chancery Court, the general
incorporation laws, and even the influence of the DuPont Company itself,”
notably due to the employment impacts of credit card operations.50 Perhaps
inevitably, credit card-issuing banks have become a correlatively significant
force in Delaware politics.51
One might imagine all of this arising as a straightforward and direct
extension of Delaware’s general dominance in the market for corporate
charters. As we will see, the two domains are closely related. Yet, the story
is in fact more complicated and involves significant, ongoing competition
with other states. Indeed, in a manner not unlike the early experience with
incorporations, where Delaware took a leaf from New Jersey’s statute book,
the relevant history for credit cards begins elsewhere—in this instance, South
Dakota. South Dakota pioneered a new form of charter competition
fundamentally akin to that for corporations generally—only here, the core
competitive drivers have been the perceived attractiveness of banking
regulations related to credit card issuance.

47. David Dayen, Tom Carper’s 40-Year Record of Defending Banks Is Being Challenged by
Kerri Harris in a Democratic Primary, THE INTERCEPT, Aug. 22, 2018,
https://theintercept.com/2018/08/22/tom-carper-delaware-primary-banks/.
48. Claire Tsosie, Why So Many Credit Cards Are From Delaware, FORBES, Apr. 14, 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/clairetsosie/2017/04/14/why-so-many-credit-cards-are-fromdelaware/#ee4a1b01119b.
49. See Delaware Business Roundtable, supra note 41, at 19 (analogizing between Delaware’s
approach to corporate law and its approach to financial services, and “credit card operations”
specifically).
50. BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 21–22; see also DEL. ECON. DEV. OFF., supra note
45, at 10–11, 14, 43.
51. See BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 64–65; Dayen, supra note 47; Tim Murphy,
House of Cards: How Joe Biden Helped Build a Financial System That’s Great for Delaware Banks
and
Terrible
for
the
Rest
of
Us,
MOTHER
JONES,
Nov./Dec.
2019,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/11/biden-bankruptcy-president/.
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Under Section 85 of the National Bank Act, a national bank may charge
“interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is
located.”52 This places great weight on how the location of a bank is legally
determined. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Marquette National
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation53 that, for
purposes of Section 85, a bank is located “in the State named in its
organization certificate.”54
Consequently, as the Court candidly
acknowledged, when a bank issues a credit card across state lines, “the
interest rates of one State are ‘exported’ into another.”55 The Court well
understood that this might “significantly impair the ability of States to enact
effective usury laws,” and invited those unhappy with this outcome to express
their views to Congress.56 The Court’s broad interpretation of Section 85’s
other critical term, “interest,” would subsequently expand the reach of a
bank’s capacity to “export” favorable laws from one state to another to
include various bank-imposed fees as well.57
The potential for bank chartering competition created by the Supreme
Court’s Marquette holding was amplified, as a practical matter, by the
inherent “mobility of credit cards.”58 This opened a potential national
banking market at a time when New Deal-era regulations otherwise
fragmented the banking industry along state lines,59 and when market
conditions were otherwise creating substantial financial challenges for banks.
Rampant inflation in the 1970s had driven banks’ cost of funds—i.e. the
interest paid to depositors—above what the banks could in turn charge for
loans under state usury laws.60 New York’s limits were particularly

52. 12 U.S.C. § 85.
53. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
54. Id. at 310.
55. Id. at 314. For additional background, see Alex Cramer, Delaware, South Dakota and
Utah: Home Is Where the Card Is?, FINAL, Apr. 18, 2017, https://getfinal.com/companynews/2017/04/18/issuing-states/; Dayen, supra note 47; Tsosie, supra note 48; Sean H. Vanatta,
Citibank, Credit Cards, and the Local Politics of National Consumer Finance, 1968-1991, 90 BUS.
HIST. REV. 57, 72–73 (2016).
56. Marquette, 439 U.S. 299 at 318–19.
57. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (interpreting the term
“interest” to include various bank fees).
58. Vanatta, supra note 55, at 58; see also O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 146
(characterizing the resulting federal regime as a “choice-of-law rule” that “sparked jurisdictional
competition to attract banks and their assets”).
59. See Vanatta, supra note 55, at 59–60; see also MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 54–59 (1994).
60. Interview:
Bill
Janklow,
FRONTLINE,
Aug.
24,
2004,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/interviews/janklow.html (interview with
former Governor of South Dakota).
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restrictive, imposing interest rate ceilings while at the same time prohibiting
banks from charging fees to offset costs of credit card administration.61
Large banks with global operations already understood from the
international context that capital mobility permits regulatory arbitrage,62 and
the Marquette decision led them to reconsider their domestic operations
through this lens—Citibank being the first mover. New York had refused to
raise its usury limit, so in early 1980 Citibank decided to move its credit card
operations to a more accommodating jurisdiction. Citibank developed a
shortlist of states with high usury limits, no major competitors already there,
and legislatures in session—criteria that yielded two possibilities: Missouri
and South Dakota.63 Under the Bank Holding Company Act, Citibank
required an affirmative invitation from a would-be host state, and Missouri
balked due to opposition from local bankers who feared such a large potential
competitor.64 South Dakota, on the other hand—a state in such dire economic
straits that they had already decided to scrap usury limits to promote the flow
of credit—proved more accommodating and extended an invitation to
Citibank in exchange for a jobs guarantee.65
By any measure, this proved to be a phenomenally successful economic
development initiative for South Dakota. The initial 1980 deal with Citibank
envisioned 400 jobs,66 yet Citibank would ultimately become one of the
state’s most significant private employers.67 As of 2017, there were “20,000
jobs in financial services in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,”68 and it is critical to
bear in mind the outsized impact such job figures have there. Like Delaware,
South Dakota is one of the least populous states in the country, meaning that
this number of jobs has far greater impact, from an economic development
perspective, than the same number of jobs would have in a much larger
jurisdiction like New York.69 According to the South Dakota Governor’s
Office of Economic Development, financial services was “the No. 1 industry
in South Dakota, accounting for more than 15% of our economy” in 2015,
and the state had “one of the highest concentrations of GDP attributable to

61. See Vanatta, supra note 55, at 62–65, 70.
62. Id. at 61, 75–76, 79–80.
63. Id. at 73.
64. Id.; Interview: Bill Janklow, supra note 60.
65. See Interview: Bill Janklow, supra note 60; Tsosie, supra note 48; Vanatta, supra note 55,
at 74–76. Local South Dakota bankers were protected by limits placed on Citibank’s capacity to
engage in deposit-taking in South Dakota. See Vanatta, supra note 55, at 75.
66. See Interview: Bill Janklow, supra note 60.
67. See South Dakota Governor’s Office of Economic Development, Major Employers,
https://sdreadytowork.com/build-your-business/major-employers/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
68. Cramer, supra note 55.
69. See Interview: Bill Janklow, supra note 60; see also BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18,
at 1 (observing that South Dakota is one of the few states with a smaller population than Delaware).
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the finance industry in the nation, surpassed only by Delaware” (15.5%
versus 29.2%).70 South Dakota also ranked first in bank assets in 2015, with
holdings of $2.83 trillion.71 Naturally, this all suggests that big banks have
substantial political and economic clout in South Dakota, and the State
clearly aims to maintain a competitive business and tax climate relative to
other states in order to attract and retain financial services providers.72
It is hardly surprising that Delaware, observing South Dakota’s success
in a closely related field, would perceive an opportunity for itself. Indeed,
Delaware was clued into the foregoing developments quite early because, as
it happened, Delaware was effectively in the room when South Dakota and
Citibank struck their initial deal in 1980. As South Dakota’s then-Governor
Bill Janklow would later recall in a 2004 interview:
… On Citibank’s board of directors were all these corporate
titans, and one of them was Irving Shapiro. Irving Shapiro was
the CEO of DuPont Company, headquartered in Delaware. And
Shapiro, when we were doing our Citibank deal, went back to
Delaware and said to Pete du Pont, who was then the governor of
Delaware: “Pete, this is crazy. Delaware has got this long history
of being kind of the corporate locus for America. This financial
services industry, it’s all going to go to South Dakota. Let’s get
the law changed in Delaware.” And so Delaware actually
changed their law in the following year.73
That Delaware could effectively leverage its preexisting corporate
platform to expand and diversify through this related form of bank charter
competition was lost on no one, and other banks similarly seeking a new
home for their credit card operations were quick to move. Then-Governor
du Pont, “scion to another major state industry, heard from Chase Manhattan
executives that if he combined Delaware’s existing business-friendly
incorporation rules with loosened financial regulations, banks would swarm
into the state.”74 Essentially, Chase Manhattan requested and received from

70. South Dakota Governor’s Office of Economic Development, South Dakota Financial
Services Industry Quick Stats, https://sdreadytowork.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Financial
Services-QuickStats-2015.pdf (updated Mar. 2015).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., South Dakota Governor’s Office of Economic Development, 50 State
Comparison, https://sdreadytowork.com/tools-resources/50-state-comparison/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2020); South Dakota Governor’s Office of Economic Development, Financial Services,
https://sdreadytowork.com/key-industries/financial-services/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020); South
Dakota
Governor’s
Office
of
Economic
Development,
Rankings,
https://sdreadytowork.com/media-center/rankings/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
73. Interview: Bill Janklow, supra note 60; see also Vanatta, supra note 55, at 77–78 (observing
that Delaware “passed legislation virtually identical to that of South Dakota,” and that “forty-four
states had either loosened or lifted their usury laws by 1983”).
74. Dayen, supra note 47.
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Delaware the same deal that Citibank had received in South Dakota.75
Reasoning that “Delaware was much closer to New York compared with
South Dakota,” and that “several major banks were already incorporated
there because of the state’s Chancery Court,”76 Delaware developed an
ambitious plan, building directly on the corporate platform to become, in
then-Governor du Pont’s words, “the Luxembourg of the United States.”77 It
would not take long to generate results, as a “dozen companies . . . opened
offices in Delaware in the first year alone.”78 By the late 1990s, “four of the
five largest credit card firms in the country had set up in Wilmington, and the
industry employed at least 35,000 people.”79 MBNA, in particular, would
come to represent a major force in Delaware’s economy and politics,80
ultimately becoming Delaware’s largest private employer and a major source
of campaign contributions prior to its acquisition by Bank of America in
2006.81
The Financial Center Development Act of 1981, which largely
“deregulated Delaware laws governing bank-issued credit cards,”82 permitted
banks to set up credit card operations in Delaware if they undertook to
employ at least 100 people.83 Today, while Delaware has a general usury
limit of 5% above the Federal Reserve discount rate,84 this limit expressly
does not apply to credit cards issued by Delaware banks85—for which there
is no limit on interest rates or fees.86 Meanwhile, Delaware’s position
remains strong. As of 2018, about 48,000 Delaware residents were employed
in financial services,87 and the preexisting corporate platform remains a
significant element of the larger financial services strategy. “Even after
75. See Tsosie, supra note 48.
76. Id. (ascribing this reasoning to former Delaware Secretary of State Glenn Kenton).
Delaware remains a dominant jurisdiction of incorporation for major bank holding companies. See
Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two
Fundamental Tensions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 963 (2018).
77. Murphy, supra note 51 (quoting du Pont).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Dayen, supra note 47.
81. See BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 64–65.
82. Id. at 21.
83. See Dayen, supra note 47; Tsosie, supra note 48.
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2301(a), 2304(a).
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 953 (“Any other law of this State limiting the rate or amount
of interest, discount, points, finance charges, service charges or other charges which may be
charged, taken, collected, received or reserved shall not apply to extensions of credit under a
revolving credit plan operated in accordance with this subchapter.”). See also id. § 956 (providing
that a credit card issued by a Delaware-incorporated bank “shall be governed by the laws of this
State”).
86. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 941(4), 943–45, 950.
87. See Dayen, supra note 47.
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federal laws restricting interstate banking were repealed in 1994, Delaware
remained a credit card industry stronghold because of its low tax rate for
banks and [its] Chancery Court,”88 suggesting that the same suite of
characteristics and strategies that positioned Delaware to thrive in financial
services has also tended to cement its status in this related field as national
regulatory conditions have evolved. Other competitors with accommodating
banking regimes do, however, remain strong as well—including South
Dakota,89 which, as discussed above, has worked hard to preserve and build
upon its first-mover advantage.
2. Captive Insurance
In much the same way that Delaware followed the lead of South Dakota
to build upon its preexisting strengths in the related field of financial services,
Delaware followed the lead of another state to leverage corporate law in the
related field of insurance—in this case, Vermont. Delaware’s competition to
attract captive insurance business represents another extension of Delaware’s
fundamental advantage in corporate law. In this marketplace, however,
Delaware faces more substantial competition from both domestic and foreign
jurisdictions.
Captive insurance is essentially a sophisticated form of self-insurance
accomplished through a subsidiary formally organized as an insurance
entity.90 A range of structures are available to self-insure individual entities
or groups.91 Although tax abuses remain a constant concern (stemming from
rules permitting deduction of premium payments), captive insurance is
nevertheless widely regarded as a critical risk management tool—particularly
in areas such as healthcare, where insurance markets remain underdeveloped,
rendering coverage expensive or impossible to obtain.92

88. Tsosie, supra note 48.
89. See Cramer, supra note 55 (describing Delaware, South Dakota, and Utah as competitors);
Vanatta, supra note 55, at 78 (describing Delaware, Nevada, and South Dakota as competitors).
90. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 59–61; History of Captives, CAPTIVE EXPERTS LLC,
www.captiveexperts.com/History_of_Captives.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2020); Sandy Bigglestone,
Dir. of Captive Insurance, Dep’t of Fin. Regulation, Ian Davis, Dir. of Fin. Servs., Dep’t of Econ.
Dev., & David Provost, Deputy Comm’r of Captive Insurance, Dep’t of Fin. Regulation, Captive
Insurance
101:
Presentation
to
Vermont
Legislature
(Jan.
22,
2019)
https://legislature.vermont.gov/Documents/2020/WorkGroups/House%20Commerce/Captive%20I
nsurance/W~David%20Provost~Captives%20101~1-22-2019.pdf [hereinafter Presentation to
Vermont Legislature].
91. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6902(12); Presentation to Vermont Legislature, supra
note 90.
92. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 61–62; History of Captives, supra note 90; Why Vermont?,
VERMONT CAPTIVE INS., https://www.vermontcaptive.com/why-vermont/ (last visited Jan. 15,
2020). The Internal Revenue Service ultimately acknowledged the business case for captive
insurance in 2002. See History of Captives, supra note 90.
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Relative to the market for credit card-issuing bank charters, the market
for captive insurance domiciling differs in two critical respects: first, it is
global in nature, and second, it is more competitive. The perennial leaders in
the captive insurance market are (in order) Bermuda, the Cayman Islands,
and Vermont—two British Overseas Territories and a U.S. state.93 These
three jurisdictions remain at the top of the table of the largest captive
insurance domiciles, followed by Utah, Delaware, Guernsey, Barbados,
Anguilla, Hawaii, and North Carolina.94 As this list conveys, sub-sovereign
jurisdictions predominate both globally and within the United States.95 It also
makes clear that Delaware—although certainly among the top domiciles—
does not remotely dominate the field, either internationally or domestically.
Here, again, Delaware followed earlier movers. Bermuda entered the
field first in the 1960s, followed by the Cayman Islands in the 1970s, and
Vermont—the first U.S. domicile—in the 1980s.96 As it was for Delaware
and South Dakota, pursuit of cross-border corporate and financial services
business was, for Vermont, an economic development imperative. Indeed,
Vermont reflects many of the characteristics and strategies associated with
MDSJs above.97 Being a small state with limited economic development
options,98 Vermont nevertheless benefits from the ease of coordination that a
limited number of more proximate public and private actors provides—
facilitating “a nimble regulatory environment” and ensuring better “[a]ccess
to government officials” in service-based industries including captive
insurance.99 In these and other ways, Vermont has actively developed and
promoted a “strong business environment.”100
When Vermont struck upon captive insurance as a potential field of
specialization, “the Vermont legislature responded with laws that provided
predictability and a fair regulatory environment,” as their “Comprehensive
Economic Development Strategy” recounts.101 Over time, “expertise for
93. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 60–61.
94. Largest
Captive
Domiciles,
BUS.
INS.
(Jan.
1,
2020),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20190103/news06/912325933/business-insurance2018-data-rankings-largest-captive-domiciles. See also AGENCY OF COMMERCE AND CMTY. DEV.
ET AL., VERMONT 2020: COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 67, 92–93,
https://accd.vermont.gov/sites/accdnew/files/documents/DED/CEDS/CEDS2020FullReport.pdf
(updated Feb. 2016); Presentation to Vermont Legislature, supra note 90.
95. Of these, only Barbados is a full sovereign. See Barbados, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/bb.html (updated Oct. 21, 2020).
96. See History of Captives, supra note 90; Why Vermont?, supra note 92.
97. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 41–49.
98. See AGENCY OF COMMERCE AND CMTY. DEV. ET AL., supra note 94, at 7, 11, 13.
99. Id. at 65–66.
100. Id. at 19–20, 65–66.
101. Id. at 92.
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forming and managing captives became centered in Vermont and the state
maintains its competitive advantage with responsive legislation, clear
regulation and a knowledge base to keep new captives locating in the
state.”102 Accordingly, the “mission” of Vermont’s Captive Insurance
Division “is to maintain a regulatory system that attracts quality business to
Vermont, promotes our reputation in the industry, and ensures the solvency
of captive insurers while recognizing the special purpose for which they were
created,”103 a formulation that reflects Vermont’s pursuit of economic
development through simultaneous regulation of and appeal to a mobile
marketplace. Along these lines, the Division pursues its mission by
“[a]ttracting and licensing quality programs”; undertaking surveillance,
examinations, and enforcement; and developing policies and procedures that
are at once “effective and reasonable,” toward the goal of “[a]dvancing the
growth of Vermont’s captive industry.”104
These efforts have, to date, been quite successful. The state touts “the
largest network of experienced and knowledgeable regulators, management
professionals, in-house examiners, and service providers of any domicile,”
with “unparalleled legislative support,” in addition to an “extensive network
of captive management firms and service providers” and “the world’s largest
captive insurance trade association, the Vermont Captive Insurance
Association.”105 As of year-end 2019, Vermont had 1,159 licensed captives
with $194 billion in assets under management.106 The State collects over $25
million annually in taxes and fees, and captives support over 400 direct jobs,
in addition to providing indirect benefits—including “increased tourism
spend from board meetings” and, more generally, “improved visibility and
reputation in the business world.”107 Along these lines, the State’s economic
development strategy includes not only capitalizing on growth in this market,
but building on these strengths to expand into financial services as well.108
Overall, Vermont seeks to become “the ‘Delaware’ of insurance,” at least in
the market for captive insurance domiciling,109 where parties are free to opt
into the legal system they prefer in much the same way that the markets for
corporate charters and credit card-issuing bank charters permit.
102. Id.
103. Presentation to Vermont Legislature, supra note 90.
104. Id.
105. Why Vermont?, supra note 92.
106. See id.
107. Presentation to Vermont Legislature, supra note 90.
108. See AGENCY OF COMMERCE AND CMTY. DEV. ET AL., supra note 94, at 93.
109. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 151–52 (arguing for a broader “federal choiceof-law statute” for insurance contracts and observing that “[m]any risk retention groups have elected
to charter in Vermont, apparently because Vermont has more flexible regulations and reduced
capitalization requirements”).
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Naturally, Delaware would prefer to be the Delaware of insurance. So,
it is unsurprising that Delaware, once again, followed another state’s lead and
expanded into this new field by building upon its preexisting advantage in
corporate law and business organizations generally. In this area, Delaware
was a relative latecomer, having begun to pursue captive insurance business
only in 2005 when the General Assembly “moderniz[ed] Delaware law
regarding the formation of these companies” with the aim of “positioning
Delaware to become a home to the growing number of captive insurance
companies being created by companies worldwide.”110 The legislative policy
could not have been clearer, as the statute itself expressly states that “It is
determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding that captive
insurance companies can serve a valuable risk management function, and that
their responsible utilization and the growth of the captive insurance industry
in the State of Delaware are in the best interests of this State.”111 The
provision adds that “the purpose and policy of this chapter” includes
regulation of captive insurance entities, “provid[ing] flexibility and
opportunity” to the market, and “foster[ing] economic development in this
State through the growth of the captive insurance industry.”112
In marketing their offerings, the Delaware Department of Insurance
(“DDI”) expressly roots their value proposition as a captive insurance
domicile in their “sophisticated corporate laws, judiciary and financial
infrastructure”—in other words, the preexisting corporate law platform
discussed above, making Delaware “the preeminent jurisdiction for business”
generally—and emphasizes that “[t]hese benefits are extended to [captive
insurance] companies through the Delaware Captive Insurance Program.”113
The Delaware Captive Insurance Association (“DCIA”) likewise touts what
they call the “Delaware Advantage,” reflecting the same strategy.114
“Delaware has traditionally been the preeminent and innovative domicile for
U.S. businesses to incorporate,” they explain.115 “The Delaware Advantage
is a collection of the many benefits the state of Delaware offers to traditional
businesses. The advantages of domiciling a captive in Delaware build on
these advantages, creating the ideal domicile for captive business.”116 As to
110. Captive Insurance Program, Welcome to Captive Insurance, DELAWARE.GOV,
https://captive.delaware.gov/captive-welcome/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6901(a).
112. Id. § 6901(b). See also id. §§ 6903(d), 6914 (detailing applicable fees and taxes).
113. Captive Insurance Program, supra note 110.
114. The Delaware Advantage, DELAWARE CAPTIVE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
https://www.delawarecaptive.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3278 (last visited Jan. 15, 2020)
[hereinafter The Delaware Advantage].
115. Id.
116. Id. See also Ned Holmes, Advantage, Delaware, CAPTIVE INS. TIMES 36 (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.captiveinsurancetimes.com/specialistfeatures/specialistfeature.php?specialist_id=266
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their insurance-specific capacities, the DDI has “34 people working on
Delaware’s Captive team,” of which “15 are financial analysts,” representing
“the first-line regulator who communicates with the captive manager or
owner.”117 They are also careful to convey that, while regulation remains
robust, they contemplate a partnership with the industry. As Steve Kinion,
Director of the Captive Insurance Program, has expressed it, the “DCIA
serves as the eyes and ears for the regulators because it provides valuable
information about what is occurring in the industry. We want to hear what
the industry has to say.”118
Overall, Delaware’s pursuit of captive insurance business has been
successful. DDI reports that “Delaware is third largest domicile for captives
in the country and the fifth largest in the world.”119 As noted above, this
places Delaware in the unfamiliar, and presumably uncomfortable, position
of lagging multiple competitors both domestically (Vermont and Utah) and
internationally (Bermuda and the Cayman Islands).120 Nevertheless,
cultivating captive insurance business has had real impact in Delaware; one
study found that the industry “directly and indirectly supports 2,537
Delaware jobs, creates almost $109 million in additional income, and
generates over $5 million for the state in tax revenue.”121
Beyond generic marketing references to the business climate and
associated track record, Delaware’s captive insurance regime builds on the
corporate law platform in more direct and substantive ways. Delaware’s
regulatory system for captives is a licensing regime that works with
preexisting entity forms, meaning that virtually any type of entity can be used
to form a Delaware captive.122 Indeed, the DCIA claims that “Delaware
provides more flexibility than any other onshore jurisdiction with respect to
the legal form of organization that a captive insurance company may take.”123
As is generally the case with Delaware entities, only a minimal nexus with
&navigationaction=features&page=7&newssection=features; Why Is Delaware Fertile Ground for
Captives?, DEL. BUS. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.delawarebusinesstimes.com/why-isdelaware-fertile-ground-for-captives/.
117. Captive
Insurance
Program,
About
Captive,
DELAWARE.GOV,
https://captive.delaware.gov/about/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
118. Holmes, supra note 116 (quoting Kinion).
119. KAREN WELDIN STEWART, COMM’R OF DEL. DEP’T OF INS., THE ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CAPTIVE INSURANCE INDUSTRY TO THE DELAWARE ECONOMY: AN
ANALYSIS BY THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE’S CENTER FOR APPLIED BUSINESS & ECONOMIC
RESEARCH
(CABER),
(Aug.
2016),
https://captive.delaware.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/18/2016/12/caber-narrative-updated-by-jerry-201610.pdf.
120. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
121. STEWART, supra note 119 (reporting results from a study conducted by the University of
Delaware’s Center for Applied Business & Economic Research).
122. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6903(a), 6906.
123. The Delaware Advantage, supra note 114.
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the state of Delaware is required. While a captive must generally maintain
“its principal place of business” and have a registered office and agent for
service of process in Delaware, and hold in the state “at least 1 meeting each
year” of its board or governing body, of which at least one member must be
a Delaware resident (or have the member’s principal place of business in
Delaware),124 there “is no requirement to retain a Delaware based captive
manager.”125
Additionally, the statute authorizes the Insurance
Commissioner to issue “conditional” licenses under certain circumstances,
permitting captives to begin conducting business immediately, based on a
“statement of compliance signed by the owner . . . stating that to the best of
the owner’s belief the business plan and other documents filed . . . comply
with” stated requirements126—a same-day convenience that apparently only
Delaware offers.127 The Insurance Commissioner has additional authority,
meanwhile, to “exempt a special purpose captive insurance company” from
otherwise-applicable statutory requirements and regulations.128
At the same time, Delaware government officials and industry
representatives strongly emphasize innovations at the level of entity
organization that purportedly offer distinctive advantages in the captive
insurance context—a direct and substantive link with Delaware’s preexisting
corporate platform. In particular, the DCIA explains that only a few states
“allow series limited liability companies [series LLCs], which are set up to
allow one core company to segregate its risks” internally, and that Delaware
“has taken the regulation a step further to allow series captives.”129
Significantly, the series LLC is an innovation that arises in the first instance
under entity laws that fall within the purview of the Division of Corporations,
not the Department of Insurance.130 Delaware’s captive insurance statute
expressly provides that an individual series of an LLC can, itself, be granted
a captive license.131
The nature of this structure is somewhat abstract, and the differences
from competing structures are subtle, but the resulting advantages are
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6903(b)(2)–(4), 6906(f). More lenient rules may apply in
certain contexts, notably for “branch” captives organized elsewhere and licensed to conduct
insurance business in Delaware. See id.
125. FAQ,
DELAWARE
CAPTIVE
INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION,
https://www.delawarecaptive.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3280 (last visited Jan. 15, 2020).
126. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6903(g)(1)(c).
127. See Holmes, supra note 116.
128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6915, 6915A.
129. The Delaware Advantage, supra note 114. See also Holmes, supra note 116; Jeffrey
Simpson & Andrew Rennick, The Series LLC and Captives – A Brief History, CAPTIVE REV., Mar.
2017, at 38, 38–39.
130. See Annual Report Statistics, supra note 16 (citing series LLC provisions as “new tools that
allow businesses greater flexibility in formation and organization”).
131. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6902(32)–(33), 6903(a)(9), 6906(a).
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potentially significant. Relative to the individual cells of so-called protected
cell companies (“PCCs”), first developed in Guernsey, the individual series
of so-called series LLCs, first developed in Delaware, possess attributes more
closely akin to distinct legal entities in their own right.132 Notably, a cell
cannot contract, sue, or be sued in its own name, whereas a series can.133
Delaware’s LLC Act expressly provides that a series of a Delaware LLC can
have its own assets and liabilities, enter contracts, and sue and be sued;134
have its own distinct governance structure;135 and be independently
terminated and wound up.136 Advantages of this structure include tax,
governance, and administrative efficiencies,137 and the entity-like features
that series exhibit are thought to increase the likelihood that the desired
segregation of assets and liabilities will be respected by courts.138
Accordingly, “while Delaware also permitted the use of PCCs, it did not take
long before Series LLCs became the favored ‘serial’ structure in
Delaware.”139 Since the first series LLC license was granted in 2010, “dozens
of Series LLC structures, with hundreds of individual series, have been
formed in Delaware.”140 While, as discussed above, Delaware is not the
market leader in captive insurance (internationally or domestically), other
states “have taken note of the success of the Delaware Series LLC” and
adapted accordingly.141 This underscores that Delaware’s preexisting
corporate platform and the capacities it reflects do in fact provide substantive
competitive benefits in this related field—even if work remains to be done
for Delaware to catch up with the overall market leaders.
IV. CONCLUSION
In assessing Delaware’s competitive position vis-à-vis other
jurisdictions, much turns on the frame of reference. As the foregoing
discussion demonstrates, while Delaware’s historical achievements and
contemporary advantages in the domestic competition for corporate charters
132. Simpson & Rennick, supra note 129, at 38–39. As Simpson and Rennick explain, these
structures are themselves modeled upon series investment trusts, which have long “allowed the
segregation of various investment portfolios” in the mutual fund industry. Id. at 38.
133. See id. at 38–39.
134. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b)(1).
135. See id. §§ 18-215(b)(3)–(5).
136. See id. §§ 18-215(b)(9)–(11).
137. See The Delaware Advantage, supra note 114; Simpson & Rennick, supra note 129, at 38.
138. See Simpson & Rennick, supra note 129, at 39. On the confusion that courts have exhibited
in this regard, see Ofer Eldar & Andrew Verstein, The Enduring Distinction between Business
Entities and Security Interests, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 255–65 (2019).
139. Simpson & Rennick, supra note 129, at 39.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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are indeed impressive—and while it remains difficult to imagine a credible
domestic threat in this context (short of outright federal preemption with
respect to public companies, which remains unlikely)—Delaware’s position
differs when one looks beyond corporate charters, and beyond domestic
competitors.
Driven largely by economic development imperatives that are well
familiar to smaller jurisdictions around the world, and with the prudent aim
of diversifying state revenues, Delaware has endeavored to leverage its
preexisting corporate law platform in distinct though related fields where
businesses similarly have choices to make about the governing law, and
where chartering dynamics and entity structures similarly loom large.
This broader framing complicates prevailing accounts of Delaware’s
competitive landscape and future prospects. Even when the inquiry remains
focused on corporate chartering, prevailing accounts fail to address global
competition, which threatens to erode Delaware’s position both domestically
and abroad. At the same time, expanding the frame of reference to include
additional fields of competition opens a new perspective on Delaware’s
motivations and competitive position in multiple respects. Notably, it reflects
an underlying economic development imperative to branch out beyond
corporate law; it reveals that, in certain markets, Delaware occupies the less
familiar, and perhaps uncomfortable, posture of being a follower rather than
a market leader; and it illuminates a larger and more complex competitive
landscape for cross-border corporate and financial services where Delaware
does indeed face meaningful competition, both from other states and from
foreign jurisdictions.
Delaware’s long-term prospects may substantially turn on how
effectively the state navigates this broader competitive landscape. This, in
turn, requires a reconceptualization of the relevant marketplace—one that is
more embracing and multi-faceted than prevailing accounts contemplate.

